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Abstract
We revisit the problem of differentially private release of classification queries. In this prob-
lem, the goal is to design an algorithm that can accurately answer a sequence of classification
queries based on a private training set while ensuring differential privacy. We formally study
this problem in the agnostic PAC model and derive a new upper bound on the private sample
complexity. Our results improve over those obtained in a recent work [BTT18] for the agnostic
PAC setting. In particular, we give an improved construction that yields a tighter upper bound on
the sample complexity. Moreover, unlike [BTT18], our accuracy guarantee does not involve any
blow-up in the approximation error associated with the given hypothesis class.
Given any hypothesis class with VC-dimension d, we show that our construction can privately
answer up to m classification queries with average excess error α using a private sample of size
≈ d
α2
max
(
1,
√
mα3/2
)
. Using recent results on private learning with auxiliary public data,
we extend our construction to show that one can privately answer any number of classification
queries with average excess error α using a private sample of size ≈ d
α2
max
(
1,
√
dα
)
. When
α = O
(
1√
d
)
, our private sample complexity bound is essentially optimal.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we revisit the problem of answering a sequence of classification queries in the agnostic
PAC model under the constraint of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. An algorithm for this problem is given
a private training dataset S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} of n i.i.d. binary-labeled examples drawn
from some unknown distributionD overX ×Y , whereX denotes an arbitrary data domain (space of
feature-vectors) and Y denotes a set of binary labels (e.g., {0, 1}). The algorithm is also given as in-
put some hypothesis classH ⊆ {0, 1}X of binary functions mappingX to Y . The algorithm accepts
a sequence of classification queries given by a sequence of i.i.d. feature-vectorsQ = (x˜1, x˜2, . . .),
drawn from the marginal distribution of D over X , denoted as DX . Here, the feature-vectors defin-
ing the set of queriesQ do not involve any privacy constraint. The queries are also assumed to arrive
one at a time, and the algorithm is required to answer the current query x˜j by predicting a label yˆj
for it before seeing the next query (online setting). The goal is to answer up to a given number m
of queries (which is a parameter of the problem) such that, (i) the entire process of answering them
queries is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, and (ii) the average excess error in the predicted labels does
not exceed some desired level α ∈ (0, 1); specifically, 1m
∑m
j=1 1 (yˆj 6= y˜j) ≤ α +minh∈H err (h;D) ,
where y˜ is the corresponding (hidden) true label, andmin
h∈H
err(h;D) is the approximation error asso-
ciated with H, i.e., the least possible true (population) error that can be attained by a hypothesis in
H (see Section 2 for formal definitions).
One could argue that a more direct approach for differentially private classification would be to
design a differentially private learner that, given a private training set as input, outputs a classifier that
is safe to publish and then can be used to answer any number of classification queries. However, there
are several pessimistic results that either limit or eliminate the possibility of differentially private
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learning even for elementary problems such as one-dimensional thresholds [BNSV15, ALMM18].
Therefore, it is natural to study the problem of classification-query release under differential privacy
as an alternative approach.
A recent formal investigation of this problem was carried out in [BTT18]. This recent work
gives an algorithm based on a combination of two useful techniques from the literature on differen-
tial privacy, namely, the sub-sample-and-aggregate technique [NRS07, ST13] and the sparse-vector
technique [DR14]. The algorithm in [BTT18], hereafter denoted as ASubSamp, assumes oracle ac-
cess to a generic, non-private (agnostic) PAC learner B for H. In this work, we give non-trivial
improvements over the results of [BTT18] in the agnostic PAC setting. More details on the com-
parison to [BTT18] are given in the “Related work” section below. Our improvements are in terms
of the attainable accuracy guarantees and the associated private sample complexity bounds in the
agnostic setting. These improvements are achieved via importing new ideas and techniques from
literature (particularly, the elegant agnostic-to-realizable reduction technique of [BNS15] to provide
an improved construction for the one that appeared in [BTT18].
Main results
In this work, we formally study algorithms for classification queries release under differential privacy
in the agnostic PAC model. We focus on the sample complexity of such algorithms as a function of
the privacy and accuracy parameters as well as the number of queries to be answered.
• We give an algorithm for this problem that is well-suited for the agnostic setting. Our algorithm
is a two-stage construction that is based on a careful combination of the relabeling technique of
[BNS15] and the private classification algorithmASubSamp of [BTT18] (see “Techniques” section
below).
• We show that our construction provides significant improvements over the results of [BTT18] for
the agnostic setting:
– The error guarantees in [BTT18] involves a constant blow-up (a multiplicative factor ≈ 3) in
the approximation errormin
h∈H
err(h;D) associated with the given hypothesis classH. Using our
construction, we give a standard excess error guarantee that does not involve such a blow-up.
– We show that our construction can answer up to m queries with average excess error α using
a private sample whose size ≈ VC(H)/α2 ·max (1,√mα3/2) (assuming ǫ is a constant, e.g.
0.1), where VC(H) is the VC-dimension ofH. Note that this implies that we can answer up to
≈ 1/α3 queries with private sample size that is essentially the same as the standard non-private
sample complexity in the agnostic PAC model. i.e., that many queries can be answered with
essentially no additional cost due to privacy.
– Using recent results of [ABM19] on the sample complexity of semi-private learners (introduced
in [BNS13]), we show that our construction immediately leads to a universal private classifi-
cation algorithm that can answer any number of classification queries using a private sample
of size ≈ VC(H)α2 · max
(
1,
√
VC(H)α
)
, which is independent of the number of queries. We
note that when α = O
(
1√
VC(H)
)
, our sample bound nearly matches the standard non-private
sample complexity in agnostic PAC model. This implies that in this regime, we attain a nearly
optimal sample complexity bound for privately answering any number of classification queries.
Equivalently, our bound is nearly optimal for any class H with VC(H) = O(1/α2). We note
that the setting studied in [ABM19] is tantamount to the setting of offline (batch) classification
where the whole set of unlabeled data (the set of queries in our case) is available and given
to the algorithm beforehand. Whereas, as described earlier, in this work we study the online
setting (which was also studied in [BTT18]). Hence, the upper bound on the private sample
complexity obtained in [ABM19] is not valid in our setting.
Techniques: Our algorithm is a two-stage construction. In the first stage, the input training set is
pre-processed once and for all via a relabeling procedure due to Beimel et al. [BNS15] in which
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the labels are replaced with the labels generated by an appropriately chosen hypothesis in the given
hypothesis class H. This step allows us to reduce the agnostic setting to a realizable one. In the
second stage, we first sample a new training set from the empirical distribution of the relabeled
set in the first stage, then feed it to ASubSamp of [BTT18] together with other appropriately chosen
input parameters. To formally prove the accuracy guarantee of our construction, in our analysis
we use some tools from learning theory (e.g., the uniform-convergence argument of Claim 3.6).
As mentioned earlier, we also use the framework of semi-private learning [BNS13, ABM19] to
transform our algorithm into a universal private classification algorithm.
Related work
Our results are most closely related to [BTT18]. In [BTT18], Bassily et al. provide formal accuracy
guarantees for their algorithm in both the realizable and agnostic settings of the PAC model. How-
ever, the accuracy guarantees they provide for the agnostic setting is far from optimal. In particular,
their guarantees involves a constant blow-up in the approximation errormin
h∈H
err(h;D), which would
limit the utility of their construction in scenarios where the approximation error is not negligible.
In fact, in most typical scenarios in practice, the approximation error associated with the hypothesis
(model) class is a non-negligible constant, (e.g., the test error attained by some state-of-the-art neural
networks on benchmark datasets can be as large as 5%, or 10%). Our improved construction avoids
this blow-up in the approximation error.
The construction in [BTT18] can answer up to m queries with average excess error α + O(γ)
(where γ = min
h∈H
err(h;D) is the approximation error) using a private sample of size ≈ VC(H)α2 ·
max (1,
√
mα) (follows from [BTT18, Theorem 3.5]). Given our results discussed in the “Main
results” section above, it follows that our sample complexity bound is tighter than that of [BTT18]
by roughly a factor of max (1,min (
√
mα, 1/α)). In particular, our bound is tighter by roughly a
factor of
√
mα for 1α ≤ m < 1α3 , and it is tighter by roughly a factor of 1α form ≥ 1α3 . Equivalently,
for the same private sample size, our construction can answer roughly a factor of 1/α2 more queries
than that of [BTT18].
Bassily et al. [BTT18] also extend their construction to provide a semi-private learner that
can finally produce a classifier. This is done by answering a sufficiently large number of queries
then applying the knowledge transfer technique using the new training set formed by the set of
answered queries. The output classifier can then be used to answer any subsequent queries, and
hence, their extended construction provides a universal private classification algorithm. Their pri-
vate sample complexity bound for this task is ≈ VC(H)3/2/α5/2 (see [BTT18, Theorem 4.3]). On
the other hand, our universal private classification algorithm yields a private sample complexity
bound≈ VC(H)α2 ·max
(
1,
√
VC(H)α
)
, which is tighter than that of [BTT18] by roughly a factor of
min
(√
VC(H)
α ,
1
α3/2
)
. Moreover, our bound is nearly optimal when α = O
(
1/
√
VC(H)
)
.
Other related works: Prior to the work of [BTT18], there have been several works that consid-
ered similar problem settings, e.g., [HCB16, PAE+17, PSM+18], however, without formal accuracy
guarantees. [DF18] considers the problem of differentially private classification in the single-query
setting, and give upper bounds on the private sample complexity for that problem in the PAC model.
Our results imply that the bound shown in [DF18] for the agnostic setting is sub-optimal. In the
single-query setting (i.e.,m = 1), our bound is essentially optimal as it nearly matches the standard
non-private sample complexity in the agnostic PAC model.
2 Preliminaries
Notation: For classification tasks we denote the space of feature vectors by X , the set of labels by
Y , and the data universe by U = X × Y . A function h : X → Y is called a hypothesis and it labels
data points in the feature space X by either 0 or 1 i.e. Y = {0, 1}. A set of hypothesesH ⊆ {0, 1}X
is called a hypothesis class. The VC dimension of H is denoted by VC(H). We use D to denote a
3
distribution defined over U = X ×Y , andDX to denote the marginal distribution overX . A sample
dataset of n i.i.d. draws from D is denoted by S = {(x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn)}, where xi ∈ X and
yi ∈ Y .
Expected error: The expected error of a hypothesis h : X → Y with respect to a distribution D
over U is defined by err(h;D) , E
(x,y)∼D
[1(h(x) 6= y)]. The excess expected error is defined as
err(h;D)−min
h∈H
err(h;D).
Empirical error: The empirical error of a hypothesis h : X → Y with respect to a labeled set S is
denoted by êrr(h;S) , 1n
∑n
i=1 1(h(xi) 6= yi).
The problem of minimizing the empirical error on a dataset is known as Empirical Risk Minimization
(ERM). We use hERMS to denote the hypothesis that minimizes the empirical error with respect to a
dataset S, hERMS , argmin
h∈H
êrr(h;S).
Expected disagreement: The expected disagreement between a pair of hypotheses h1 and h2 with
respect to a distribution DX is defined as dis(h1, h2;DX ) , E
x∼DX
[1(h1(x)) 6= h2(x))] .
Empirical disagreement: The empirical disagreement between a pair of hypotheses h1 and h2 w.r.t.
an unlabeled dataset Su = {x1, . . . , xn} is defined as d̂is(h1, h2;Su) , 1n
n∑
i=1
1(h1(xi)) 6= h2(xi)).
Realizable setting: In the realizable setting of the PAC model, there exists a h∗ ∈ H such that
err(h∗;D) = 0 i.e., the true labeling function is assumed to be in H. In this case, the distribution
D can be described by DX and the hypothesis h∗ ∈ H. Such a distribution D is called realizable
by H. Hence, for realizable distributions, the expected error of a hypothesis h will be denoted as
err(h; (DX , h∗)) , E
x∼DX
[1(h(x) 6= h∗(x))].
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DKM+06, DMNS06]). Let ǫ, δ > 0. A (randomized) algorithm
M : Un → R is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of datasets S, S′ ∈ Un that differs in
exactly one data point, and every measurable O ⊆ R, with probability at least 1 − δ over the coin
flips ofM , we have:
Pr (M(S) ∈ O) ≤ eǫ · Pr (M(S′) ∈ O) + δ.
We study private classification algorithms that take as input a private labeled dataset S ∼ Dn,
and a sequence of classification queriesQ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜m) ∼ DmX , defined bym unlabeled feature-
vectors from X , (where m is an input parameter), and output a corresponding sequence of pre-
dictions, i.e., labels, (yˆ1, . . . , yˆm). Here, we assume that the classification queries come one at a
time and the algorithm is required to generate a label for the current query before seeing and re-
sponding to the next query. The goal is: i) after answering m queries the algorithm should satisfy
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, and ii) the labels generated should be (α, β)-accurate with respect to a
hypothesis class H: a notion of accuracy which we formally define shortly. We give a generic
description of the above classification paradigm in Algorithm 1 below (denoted as APrivClass).
Algorithm 1 APrivClass: Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm
Input: Private dataset: S ∈ (X × Y)n, upper bound on the number of queries: m, online sequence
of classification queries: Q = (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜m), hypothesis class: H, privacy parameters
ǫ, δ > 0, accuracy: α, and failure probability: β
1: for j = 1, . . . ,m do
2: yˆj ← PrivLabel(S,H, x˜j) {Generic procedure that, given S,H, and query x˜j , generates a
label yˆj}
3: Output yˆj
The algorithm APrivClass invokes a procedure PrivLabel, which is a generic classification proce-
dure that given the input private training set S and the knowledge of hypothesis classH, it generates
a label for an input query (feature-vector) x˜ ∈ X .
Definition 2.2 ((ǫ, δ, α, β, n,m)-Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm). Let H be a
hypothesis class H ⊆ {0, 1}X . Let ǫ, δ, α, β ∈ (0, 1). A randomized algorithm A (whose generic
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format is described in Algorithm 1) is said to be an (ǫ, δ, α, β, n,m)-PCQR (private classification-
query release) algorithm forH, if the following conditions hold:
1. For any sequenceQ ∈ Xm, A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to its input dataset.
2. For every distribution D over X × Y , given a dataset S ∼ Dn and a sequence V ,
((x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m)) ∼ Dm (where x˜i’s are the queried feature-vectors in Q and y˜i’s
are their true hidden labels), A is (α, β)-accurate with respect to H, where our notion of
(α, β)-accuracy is defined as follows: With probability at least 1− β over the choice of S, V ,
and the internal randomness in PrivLabel (Step 2 in Algorithm 1), we have
1
m
m∑
j=1
1(yˆj 6= y˜j) ≤ α+ γ,
where γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D).
In the realizable setting, we have an analogous definition where γ = 0. In this case, we say that the
algorithm is a PCQR algorithm forH in the realizable setting.
2.1 Previous work on private classification-query release [BTT18]
In [BTT18], they give a construction for a PCQR algorithm (referred to as ASubSamp), which com-
bines the sub-sample-aggregate framework [NRS07, ST13] with the sparse-vector technique [DR14].
Bassily et al. [BTT18] provide formal privacy and accuracy guarantees with sample complexity
bounds forASubSamp in both the realizable and agnostic settings of the PAC model. As in the sparse-
vector technique, one important input parameter to ASubSamp is cut-off paramter T , which gives
bound on the number of the so-called “unstable queries” that ASubSamp can answer before the pri-
vacy budget is consumed. We formally describe ASubSamp and the notion of “unstable queries” in
Appendix B for completeness. Here, we restate the results of [BTT18] for the realizable and agnostic
settings.
Lemma 2.3 (Realizable Setting: follows from Theorems 3.2 & 3.4, [BTT18]). Let ǫ, δ > 0 and,
α, β ∈ (0, 1). Let H be a hypothesis class with VC(H) = d. Suppose that B in ASubSamp is a PAC
learner forH. LetD be any distribution overU that is realizable byH. There is a setting for the cut-
off parameter T = max
(
1, O˜ (mα)
)
such that ASubSamp is an (ǫ, δ, α, β, n,m)-PCQR algorithm
forH in the realizable setting where the private sample size is n = O˜ ( dǫ α ·max (1,√mα)).
In the agnostic setting, the accuracy guarantee of [BTT18] is not compatible with Definition 2.2;
the accuracy guarantee therein has a sub-optimal dependency on the approximation error, γ (where
γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D)). In particular, their result entails a blow-up in γ by a constant factor (≈ 3). This
significantly limit the applicability of this result in scenarios where γ ≫ α.
Lemma 2.4 (Agnostic Setting: follows from Theorems 3.2 & 3.5, [BTT18]). Let ǫ, δ, α, β ∈ (0, 1).
Let H be a hypothesis class with VC(H) = d. Suppose B in ASubSamp is an agnostic PAC learner
for H. Let D be any distribution over U , and let γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D). Let S ∼ Dn denote the input
private sample to ASubSamp. Let V , ((x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m)) ∼ Dm, where x˜i’s are the queried
feature-vectors in Q and y˜i’s are their true (hidden) labels. Let (ypriv1 , . . . , yprivm ) denote the output
labels of ASubSamp. There is a setting for the cut-off parameter T = max
(
1, O˜ (m (α+ γ))
)
such
that: 1) ASubSamp is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private with respect to the input training set; 2) when the
private sample is of size n = O˜
(
d
ǫ α2 ·max (1,
√
mα)
)
, then with probability at least 1 − β over
S, V and the randomness in ASubSamp, we have:
1
m
m∑
j=1
1(yprivj 6= y˜j) ≤ α+ 3γ.
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3 Private Release of Classification Queries in the Agnostic PAC
Setting
In this section we give an improved construction for the private classification-query release algorithm
in [BTT18] in the agnostic setting. Our construction can privately answer up to m online queries
with excess classification error α, and input sample size O˜
(
VC(H)
ǫ α2 ·max
(
1,
√
m α3/2
ǫ
))
, (where O˜
hides log factors ofm, 1/α, 1/δ, 1/β). Comparing to the result of [BTT18] for the agnostic setting,
where the private sample size is ≈ VC(H)ǫ α2 · max(1,
√
mα) (Lemma 2.4), our sample complexity
bound is tighter by a factor of≈ √mα when 1α ≤ m < 1α3 , and it is tighter by a factor of≈ 1α when
m ≥ 1α3 .
Overview
Our construction is made up of two phases. The first phase is a pre-processing phase in which the
input private sample, S, is relabeled using a “good” hypothesis hˆ ∈ H to obtain a new sample
S′′. This phase is a reenactment of the elegant technique due to Beimel et al. [BNS15], which was
called LabelBoost Procedure therein. By construction hˆ is chosen such that its empirical error is
close to that of the ERM hypothesis. Hence, we can formally show that when input sample size
is sufficiently large, hˆ attains low excess error. Moving forward, one may view hˆ as if it is the
true labeling hypothesis, and hence the agnostic setting can be reduced to the realizable setting. In
Section 3.1, we describe this pre-processing phase and state its guarantees.
Now as we reduced the problem to the realizable setting, in the next phase we invoke the tech-
niques in [BTT18]. In the second phase, the relabeled training set S′′ is used to provide input training
examples to ASubSamp (described in Section 2.1). Note that S′′ is no longer i.i.d. from the original
distribution. We form a new dataset Ŝ by sampling data points uniformly with replacement from
S′′ and then feed Ŝ to ASubSamp as input. This new training set Ŝ is now i.i.d. from the empirical
distribution of S′′. Via a uniform-convergence argument (see Claim 3.6), we can show that that this
re-sampling step does not impact our desired accuracy guarantees. We also need to carefully cali-
brate the privacy parameters ofASubSamp to take into account the fact that Ŝ may contain repetitions
of the elements in S′′. AlgorithmASubSamp uses Ŝ to privately generate labels for an online sequence
of classification queries. We formally show that for any setting of the target parameters (accuracy,
privacy, and total number of queries), there is a sufficient size for the original input sample S such
that our construction attains the desired accuracy and privacy guarantees w.r.t. the entire sequence
of queries. We formally describe our construction and provide formal analysis for its privacy and
accuracy guarantees in Section 3.2.
3.1 From the agnostic to the realizable setting: A generic reduction
In this section, we describe the pre-processing procedure, denoted asARelabel (given by Algorithm 2
below), which follows from the relabeling technique devised by Beimel et al. in [BNS15].
Given a private labeled dataset S ∼ Dn as input, ARelabel randomly chooses a subset S′ of S
of size n′, where n′ ≈ ǫn. Let Su denote the unlabeled version of S′, i.e., Su = {x1, . . . , xn′},
and
∏
H(Su) denote the set of all possible dichotomies that can be generated by hypothesis class
H on the set Su. It then chooses a finite subset H˜ of H such that each dichotomy in
∏
H(Su) is
represented by one of the hypotheses in H˜ . Note that by Sauer’s lemma (see [Sau72]), the size of
H˜ is O
(
(n′/d)d
)
, where d = VC(H). Next, ARelabel chooses a hypothesis ĥ using the exponential
mechanism with privacy parameter ǫ˜ = 1 and a score function q(S′, h) = −êrr(h;S′). Finally,
ARelabel uses ĥ to rebalel Su, and outputs this labeled set S′′.
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Algorithm 2 ARelabel: Relabel Procedure
Input: Private dataset: S ∈ (X × Y)n, a hypothesis class: H, privacy parameter: ǫ ≤ 1
1: H˜ ← ∅, n′ ← ǫ3+exp(ǫ+3)n
2: Sample n′ random elements without replacement from S and add to S′. Let Su = {x1, . . . , xn′}
be the unlabeled version of S′.
3: For every (y1, . . . , yn′) ∈
∏
H(Su) = {(h(x1), . . . , h(xn′)) : h ∈ H}, add to H˜ any arbitrary
hypothesis h ∈ H s.t. h(xi) = yi, ∀i ∈ [n′].
4: Use the exponential mechanism with inputs S′, H˜ , privacy parameter ǫ˜ = 1, and a score func-
tion q(S′, h) , −êrr(h;S′) to select ĥ from H˜ .
5: Relabel Su using ĥ, and denote this relabeled dataset as S
′′.
6: Output S′′.
The following lemmas give the privacy and accuracy guarantees of ARelabel. Lemma 3.1 follows
from [BNS15]. For completeness, we prove these two lemmas in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1. Let ǫ ≤ 1. Let A be an (ǫ, δ)- differentially private algorithm. Let B be an algorithm
that invokesA on the output of ARelabel(S,H, ǫ). Then, B is (ǫ, δ)- differentially private.
Lemma 3.2. Let H be a hypothesis class with VC(H) = d. Let α, β ∈ (0, 1). Let ǫ ≤ 1 be the
input parameter to ARelabel. Let D be an arbitrary distribution over X × Y , and S ∼ Dn be an
input dataset to ARelabel, where n ≥ 256 (d+log(3/β))(3+exp(ǫ+3))ǫ α2 . With probability at least 1 − β,
hypothesis ĥ (generated in Step 4 of ARelabel) satisfies the following:
err
(
ĥ;D
)
− err (hERMS′ ;D) ≤ α,
where hERMS′ is the ERM hypothesis w.r.t. the sample S
′ generated in Step 2 of ARelabel.
3.2 A Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm
In this section, we describe our PCQR algorithm AAgPrivCl (Algorithm 3 below) that combines the
two techniques given by ARelabel, and ASubSamp. As a PCQR algorithm, AAgPrivCl takes as input: a
private dataset S ∼ Dn, the number of queriesm, an online sequence of classification queriesQ =
(x˜1, . . . , x˜m) ∼ DmX , a hypothesis class H, as well as the desired privacy and accuracy parameters.
Together with these,AAgPrivCl also has oracle access to a PAC learner BPAC forH. Note that, dataset
S′′ (output by ARelabel) is relabeled using hypothesis ĥ ∈ H. In order to ensure that our input to
the next stage is i.i.d., we sample n′ = |S′′| points uniformly with replacement from S′′ to form a
new dataset Ŝ (i.e., Ŝ is made up of n′ i.i.d. draws from the empirical distribution of S′′). Next, we
invokeASubSamp in the realizable setting on the dataset Ŝ,m,Q, and BPAC as inputs. We set the cut-
off parameter of ASubSamp as T = max
(
1, O˜(mα)
)
, where α is the accuracy parameter of BPAC.
The privacy parameters to ASubSamp are set to (ǫˆ, δˆ) defined in Step 1 of AAgPrivCl. This is needed
to ensure (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for the entire construction. Finally, we output the sequence of
private labels {ypriv1 , . . . , yprivm } generated by ASubSamp for the input sequence of queries.
7
Algorithm 3 AAgPrivCl: Private Agnostic-PAC Classification-Query Release Algorithm
Input: Private dataset: S ∈ (X × Y)n, upper bound on the number of queries: m, online sequence
of classification queries: Q = (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜m), a hypothesis class: H, oracle access to non-
private learner: BPAC forH, privacy parameters: ǫ, δ > 0, accuracy parameter: α, and, failure
probability: β
1: T ← max
(
1, 18 mα+
1
4
√
3mα log
(
m
β
))
, ǫ′ ← αmax (1,√mα)
ǫˆ← 1log(2/δ) min (ǫ′, ǫ) , δˆ ← δ2 eǫ log(2/δ)
2: S′′ ← ARelabel(S,H, ǫ, δ).
3: Ŝ ← Uniformly sample n′ points from S′′ with replacement, where n′ = |S′′|.
4: Output (ypriv1 , . . . , y
priv
m )← ASubSamp(Ŝ,m,Q,BPAC, T, ǫˆ, δˆ, β) .
We formally state the main result of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Let H be a hypothesis class with VC(H) = d. For any ǫ, δ, α, β ∈ (0, 1), AAgPrivCl
(Algorithm 3) is an (ǫ, δ, α, β, n,m)-PCQR algorithm forH, where private sample size
n = O

(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
m
β
))
log3/2
(
1
δ
)
log
(
mα
min(δ,β/2)
)
ǫ α2
·max
(
1,
√
mα3/2
ǫ
) ,
and number of queriesm = Ω
(
log(1/αβ)
α
)
.
We will prove the theorem via the following lemmas that establish the privacy and accuracy
guarantees ofAAgPrivCl .
Lemma 3.4 (PrivacyGuarantee ofAAgPrivCl). AAgPrivCl is (min (ǫ, ǫ′) , δ)-differentially private (with
respect to its input dataset), where ǫ′ = αmax (1,
√
mα) (as defined in Step 1 of AAgPrivCl).
Proof. Let R(·) denote the uniform sampling procedure in Step 3 in AAgPrivCl; that is, Step 3 can
be written as Ŝ ← R(S′′). Note that Steps 3-4 in AAgPrivCl can now be expressed as a composition
R ◦ ASubSamp, whereR ◦ ASubSamp(·) , ASubSamp(R(·)).
Let ǫ∗ = min (ǫ′, ǫ). In order to prove that AAgPrivCl is (ǫ∗, δ)-differentially private, it suffices
to to show that R ◦ ASubSamp is (ǫ∗, δ)-differentially private. Note that the input to R ◦ ASubSamp
dataset S′′, is output by ARelabel. Hence, it follows from Lemma 3.1 that if R ◦ ASubSamp is (ǫ∗, δ)-
differentially private, then AAgPrivCl is (ǫ∗, δ)-differentially private. Hence, it remains to show that
R ◦ ASubSamp is (ǫ∗, δ)-differentially private with respect to S′′.
Let S′′1 and S
′′
2 be neighboring datasets. W.l.o.g., assume that S
′′
1 and S
′′
2 differ in index j ∈ [n′].
Let r be the number of times the j-th index is sampled by R. By the definition of R, and Chernoff
bound, w.p. ≥ 1− δ/2, we have r ≤ log(2/δ).
Using the result in [BTT18, Theorem 3.1], ASubSamp is (ǫˆ, δˆ)-differentially private with respect
to Ŝ. Conditioned on r ≤ log(2δ ) and by the notion of group privacy we have, R ◦ ASubSamp
is (rǫˆ , rerǫˆ δˆ)-differentially private. Hence, by the above high probability bound on the event
r ≤ log(2δ ), we conclude thatR ◦ ASubSamp is (min (ǫ′, ǫ) , δ)-differentially private.
Remark 1. Lemma 3.4 shows that AAgPrivCl in fact attains a stronger level of privacy (in terms
of the final ǫ-parameter) when m ≤ ǫ2α3 . In fact, AAgPrivCl attains this stronger level of privacy
while satisfying the accuracy/sample-complexity guarantee given by Theorem 3.3 (even though we
do not state the theorem this way to maintain clarity and avoid complicated notation). The fact that
AAgPrivCl yields the above accuracy/sample-complexity guarantee at a higher level of privacy than
the target level ǫwill become clear in the accuracy analysis below. In a nutshell, this is due to the fact
that when 1/α / m / ǫ2/α3, given the expression of n in Theorem 3.3, the size of the input sample
to ASubSamp in Step 4 of AAgPrivCl becomes roughly dα2 . On the other hand, note that in [BTT18],
the size of the input sample to ASubSamp in the realizable setting is ≈ dη ·
√
m
α when the attained
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privacy level is η (see Lemma 2.3 above). A careful comparison of the resulting privacy guarantees
of ASubSamp for these two settings of the input sample size shows that the effective privacy loss in
our construction is roughly
√
mα3/2 (when 1/α / m / ǫ2/α3).
Lemma 3.5 (Accuracy Guarantee of AAgPrivCl). Let H be a hypothesis class with VC(H) = d.
Let BPAC (invoked by ASubSamp) be a PAC learner for H (in the realizable setting). Let D be any
distribution over X × Y , and let γ , min
h∈H
err(h;D). Let S ∼ Dn denote the input private sample
to AAgPrivCl , where
n = 8000
(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
m
β
))
log3/2
(
1
δ
)
log
(
mα
min(δ,β/2)
)
max
(
1,
√
mα3/2
ǫ
)
(3 + exp(ǫ+ 3))
ǫ α2
,
andm ≥ 8 log(1/αβ)α . Let (y˜1, . . . , y˜m) denote the corresponding true (hidden) labels for Q. Then,
w.p. at least 1− β (over the choice of S, Q, and the randomness in AAgPrivCl), we have:
1
m
m∑
j=1
1(yprivj 6= y˜j) ≤ α+ γ.
In the proof of Lemma 3.5 we will use the following claim. We defer its proof after the proof of
the lemma.
Claim 3.6. LetH be a hypothesis class with VC(H) = d. Let Su be an an unlabeled training set of
size no, where no ≥ 50 d log(1/α)+log(1/β
′)
α2 . Then, with probability at least 1−β′ for any h1, h2 ∈ H,
we have
∣∣∣dis(h1, h2;DX )− d̂is(h1, h2;Su)∣∣∣ ≤ α. (Recall that dis(h1, h2;DX ) and d̂is(h1, h2;Su)
are the expected and empirical disagreement rates, respectively, as defined in Section 2.)
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Consider the description of ARelabel in Algorithm 2. Note that, hypothesis
ĥ ∈ H selected in Step 4 of ARelabel is used to generate labels of S′′ (output dataset of ARelabel).
Note that the size of S′′ is n′ = 8000 (
d log( 1α )+log(
m
β ))polylog(m,
1
δ ,
1
β )
α2 · max
(
1,
√
mα3/2
ǫ
)
. Let
DS′′ denote the empirical distribution induced by S′′. Note that err(ĥ;DS′′) = 0. In AAgPrivCl,
dataset Ŝ (input to ASubSamp) is created by n′ i.i.d. draws from DS′′ .
From the description of ASubSamp (Algorithm 5), ASubSamp splits Ŝ into k equal-sized sub-
samples, where k = O˜
(√
T
ǫˆ
)
. Here T is the input cut-off parameter of ASubSamp whose setting
is given in Step 1 of AAgPrivCl. Note that since m = Ω
(
log(1/αβ)
α
)
, we have T = O(mα). Each
sub-sample is then fed separately as an input to BPAC. For each input sub-sample, BPAC outputs a
classifier hj , j ∈ [k]. Hence we end up with an ensemble of classifiers h1, · · · , hk. Note that the
size of the input sub-sample to BPAC is n′k . Observe that
n′ = 8000
(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
m
β
))
log3/2
(
1
δ
)
log
(
mα
min(δ,β/2)
)
α2
·max
(
1,
√
mα3/2
ǫ
)
,
and the number of sub-samples k is set in Step 1 of ASubSamp as follows
k = O

√
mα log(2δ ) · log
(
mα
min(δ,β/2)
)
ǫˆ

Hence, using the setting of ǫˆ in Step 1 of AAgPrivCl, we have
n′
k
= Ω

(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
m
β
))
√
mα5/2
· ǫ ·min
(
1,
√
mα3/2
ǫ
)
·max
(
1,
√
mα3/2
ǫ
)
= Ω

(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
m
β
))
α
 = Ω

(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
16k
β
))
α
 .
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By standard results in learning theory, it is easy to see that the size of the input sub-sample to BPAC
is sufficient for BPAC to PAC-learnH with respect to DS′′ with accuracy α24 and confidence β16k .
Fix any j ∈ [k]. Using the above fact about BPAC with probability at least 1 − β16k , we
have err(hj ;DS′′) ≤ α24 . Since DS′′ is the empirical distribution of S′′, equivalently, we have
d̂is(hj , ĥ;Su) ≤ α24 , where Su is the unlabeled version of S′′. Note that the size of S′′ is n′ ≥
7200
(d log( 1α )+log(
8k
β ))
α2 . Hence, by Claim 3.6, it follows that w.p. ≥ 1− β8k , dis(hj , ĥ;DX ) ≤ α12 .
Equivalently, w.p. ≥ 1− β8k , err
(
hj ; (DX , ĥ)
)
≤ α12 .
From the above and the fact that the queries inQ are i.i.d. fromDX , we invoke the same counting
argument in the proof of [BTT18, Theorem 3.2] to show that w.p. ≥ 1 − β4 , the output labels ofASubSamp satisfy:
1
m
m∑
i=1
1
(
yprivi 6= ĥ(x˜i)
)
≤ α
4
. (1)
Let hERMS′ denote the ERM hypothesis with respect to the dataset S
′ constructed in Step 2 ofARelabel.
Note that Lemma 3.2 implies that w.p. ≥ 1− β/4, err(ĥ;D)− err (hERMS′ ;D) ≤ α/4.
Since the queries and their true labels
(
(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m)
)
are drawn i.i.d. from D, then by
Chernoff’s bound and the fact thatm ≥ 8 log(1/β)α , we get that w.p. ≥ 1− β2 ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
1
(
ĥ(x˜i) 6= y˜i
)
− 1
m
m∑
i=1
1
(
hERMS′ (x˜i) 6= y˜i
) ≤ α
2
. (2)
Moreover, from the bound on n′ and using a basic fact from learning theory, w.p. ≥ 1 − β/8, the
ERM hypothesis hERMS′ satisfies: err
(
hERMS′ ;D
) ≤ α/8 + γ, where γ = min
h∈H
err(h;D). Again,
since
(
(x˜1, y˜1), . . . , (x˜m, y˜m)
)
are i.i.d. from D, then by Chernoff’s bound and the fact that m ≥
8 log(1/β)α , w.p. ≥ 1− β/4, we have
1
m
m∑
i=1
1
(
hERMS′ (x˜i) 6= y˜i
) ≤ α
4
+ γ. (3)
Now, using (1), (2), and (3) together with a simple application of the triangle inequality and the
union bound, we conclude that w.p. ≥ 1− β,
1
m
m∑
j=1
1
(
yprivj 6= y˜j
)
≤ α+ γ.
Proof of Claim 3.6. For Su ∼ DnoX , define the event
Bad = {∃h1, h2 ∈ H : |dis(h1, h2;DX )− d̂is(h1, h2;Su)| > α}
We will show that P
Su∼DnoX
[Bad] ≤ 2 (enod )2d exp (−noα2/8). Hence, by using a standard manip-
ulation, one can easily show that the right-hand side is bounded by β′ when no is as given in the
statement of the claim.
LetH∆ be a hypothesis class defined asH∆ , {h1∆h2 : h1, h2 ∈ H}, where h1∆h2 : X → {0, 1}
is defined as: ∀x ∈ X , h1∆h2(x) , 1(h1(x) 6= h2(x)).
Let GH∆ denote the growth function ofH∆; i.e. for any number t, GH∆(t) , maxV :|V |=t
∣∣∏H∆(V )∣∣ ,
where
∏
H∆(V ) is the set of all dichotomies that can be generated by H∆ on a set V of size
t. Now for any set V of size t, every dichotomy in
∏
H∆(V ) is determined by a pair of di-
chotomies in
∏
H(V ), and thus we get |
∏
H∆(V )| ≤ |
∏
H(V )|2. Hence, by Sauer’s Lemma
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GH∆(t) ≤ GH(t) ≤
(
et
d
)2d
. Let h0 be the all-zero hypothesis. Note that h0 ∈ H∆. Now, us-
ing a standard VC-based uniform convergence argument we have,
P
Su∼DnoX
[
∃h1, h2 ∈ H : |dis(h1, h2;DX )− d̂is(h1, h2;Su)| > α
]
≤ P
Su∼DnoX
[
∃h ∈ H∆ : |dis(h, h0;DX )− d̂is(h, h0);Su)| > α
]
≤ 2GH∆ exp (−noα2/8) ≤ 2
(eno
d
)2d
exp (−noα2/8)
Note that the first inequality in the third line is non-trivial, and is used unanimously in VC-based
uniform convergence bounds (see e.g., [SSBD14]).
4 Privately Answering Any Number of Classification Queries
In this section, we describe an universal PCQR algorithm that can answer any number of queries
with private sample size that is independent of the number of queries. The main idea is that after
answering a number of queries≈ VC(H)α , we can use the feature-vectors defining those queries as an
auxiliary “public” dataset. Recall that as defined earlier in our problem statement, the set of queries
themselves do not entail any privacy constraints. We can then invoke the framework of semi-private
learning introduced in [BNS13], where such auxiliary public dataset can be exploited to finally
generate a classifier that is safe to publish. In particular, a semi-private learner takes as input two
types of datasets: a private labeled dataset, and another auxiliary public dataset. The algorithm needs
to satisfy differential privacy only with respect to the private dataset. Alon et al.[ABM19] describe a
construction of a semi-private learner (referred to asASSPP), and show that it suffices to have a public
unlabeled dataset of size ≈ VC(H)α to privately learn any hypothesis class H with excess error α in
the agnostic setting. In particular, for any distribution D over X × Y , given a set of feature-vectors
of size ≈ VC(H)α drawn i.i.d. from DX , and a private labeled training set of ≈ VC(H)ǫ α2 drawn i.i.d.
from D, ASSPP outputs a classifier hpriv ∈ H such that err(hpriv;D) − min
h∈H
err(h;D) ≤ α w.r.t D.
Hence,ASSPP outputs a classifier that can be used to answer any number of subsequent classification
queries. For the sake of completeness, we give a formal description of ASSPP in Appendix B.
Using this result, we can extend our construction in Section 3.2 to allow for privately answering
any number of classification queries using a private training set whose size is independent of the
number of queries. In Algorithm 4 below (denoted as AUnvPrivCl), we describe our universal PCQR
algorithm.
Algorithm 4 AUnvPrivCl: Universal Private Classification-Query Release Algorithm
Input: Private dataset: S ∈ Un, number of queries: m, online sequence of classification queries:
Q = (x˜1, . . . , x˜m), hypothesis class: H, oracle access to a non-private PAC learner for H:
BPAC, privacy parameters ǫ, δ > 0, accuracy parameter α, and failure probability β.
1: mo ← 32 d log(1/α)+log(1/β)α , m′ ← min(mo,m)
2: Output (ypriv1 , . . . , y
priv
m′ )← AAgPrivCl
(
S, m′, (x˜1, . . . , x˜m′), H, BPAC, ǫ, δ, α, β
)
3: ifm′ = mo then
4: Tpub ← (x˜1, . . . , x˜mo)
5: hpriv ← ASSPP(S, Tpub,H, ǫ)
6: for j = mo + 1, . . . ,m do
7: Output yprivj ← hpriv(x˜j)
We finally formalize this observation in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.1. Let H be any hypothesis class with VC(H) = d. For any ǫ, δ, α, β ∈ (0, 1) and any
m <∞, AUnvPrivCl is an (ǫ, δ, α, β, n,m)-PCQR algorithm forH with private sample size
n = O

(
d log
(
1
α
)
+ log
(
mo
β
))
log3/2
(
1
δ
)
log
(
moα
min(δ,β/2)
)
ǫ α2
·max
(
1,
√
d α log1/2
(
1
α
)
ǫ
) ,
wheremo = O
(
d log(1/α)+log(1/β)
α
)
(as set in Step 1). In particular, when α ≤ ǫ√
d
, it would suffice
to have a private sample of size n = O˜
(
d
ǫ α2
)
.
Near-optimality of our sample complexity bound: Note that without any privacy constraints, the
sample complexity of this problem in the agnostic PAC setting is Θ
((
VC(H)+log(1/β)
α2
))
. Note that
this follows from the standard agnostic PAC learning bound and the fact that access to unlabeled data
(the set of queries) does not improve the sample complexity (unless one makes assumptions about
the conditional distribution of the true label given the unlabeled domain point) [BDLP08, Theorem
15]. Now, assuming ǫ = Θ(1), when α = O
(
1√
VC(H)
)
, our private sample complexity bound
in Theorem 4.1 nearly matches the non-private sample complexity. This shows that our bound is
optimal (up to log factors) whenever α = O
(
1√
VC(H)
)
1.
Remark 2. It is worth mentioning that applying the same technique (the semi-private learner given
in [ABM19]) to the construction of [BTT18] also yields a universal PCQR algorithm but with a
worse sample complexity bound than ours. In particular, it is not hard to see that the resulting sample
complexity bound based on the construction of [BTT18] is O˜
(
VC(H)
α2 ·max
(
1,
√
VC(H)
))
, where
O˜ hides polylog factors in (1/α, 1/β, 1/δ). Our bound is tighter by a factor of≈ α when VC(H) =
ω(1).
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The proof follows from a straightforward combination of [BNS15, Lemma 4.1]
and privacy amplification by sampling [KLN+08, LQS12]. For completeness, we give an outline
here. Fix the randomness in dataset S′ due to sampling in Step 2 of ARelabel . In this case, us-
ing [BNS15, Lemma 4.1], any algorithm B that on input a dataset S′ applies A on the outcome of
ARelabel is (ǫ+ 3, 4eδ)- differentially private. Hence, B is (ǫ+ 3, 4eδ)-differentially private. Now
we take into account the randomness due to sampling in Step 2. By privacy amplification due to
sampling [KLN+08, LQS12], it follows that B is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Note that the score function for the exponential mechanism is −êrr(h;S′)
whose global sensitivity is 1/n′. Now, by using the standard accuracy guarantees of exponen-
tial mechanism [MT07] (and the fact that its instantiated here with privacy parameter = 1), w.p.
≥ 1− β/3 we have
êrr
(
ĥ;S′
)
− êrr (hERMS′ ;S′) ≤ 2n′ (log(|H˜|) + log(3/β)) .
Given the value of n in the lemma statement, we have n′ ≥ 256 d+log(3/β)α2 . Using this setting of n′
together with Sauer’s Lemma [Sau72] to bound the size of H˜, it follows that:
êrr
(
ĥ;S′
)
− êrr (hERMS′ ;S′) ≤ 2n′
(
d log
(
en′
d
)
+ log
(
3
β
))
≤ 80α
2 (d log(1/α) + log(3/β))
256( d+ log(3/β))
≤ α/3. (4)
Given the bound on n′ and the fact that S′ ∼ Dn′ , by a standard uniform convergence argument
from learning theory [SSBD14], we have the following generalization error bounds. With probability
≥ 1− 2β/3, we have:
|err(ĥ;D)− êrr(ĥ;S′)| ≤ α/3, (5)
|err (hERMS′ ;D)− êrr (hERMS′ ;S′)| ≤ α/3 (6)
Putting (4)-(6) together, we conclude that w.p. ≥ 1− β, we have err
(
ĥ;D
)
− err (hERMS′ ;D) ≤ α.
This completes the proof.
Appendix B Constructions from previous works
B.1 Description of Algorithm ASubSamp
For completeness, here we briefly describe the algorithmASubSamp (Algorithm 5 below) in [BTT18].
The input to ASubSamp is a private labeled dataset S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}, an online sequence
of classification queries Q = (x˜1, . . . , x˜m), and a generic non-private PAC learner B for a hypoth-
esis class H. The algorithm outputs a sequence of private labels (ypriv1 , . . . , yprivm ). The key idea in
ASubSamp is as follows: first, it arbitrarily splits S into k equal-sized sub-samples S1, . . . , Sk for ap-
propriately chosen k. Each of those sub-samples is used to train B. Hence, we obtain an ensemble of
k classifiers hS1 , · · · , hSk . Next for each input query x˜i ∈ Q, the votes (hS1(x˜i), . . . , hSk(x˜i)) are
computed. It then applies the distance-to-instability test [ST13] on the difference between the largest
count of votes and the second largest count. If the majority vote is sufficiently stable, ASubSamp re-
turns the majority vote as the predicted label for x˜i; otherwise, it returns a random label. The
sparse-vector framework is employed to efficiently manage the privacy budget over the m queries.
In particular, by employing the sparse-vector technique, the privacy budget ofASubSamp is only con-
sumed by those queries where the majority vote is not stable. Algorithm ASubSamp takes an input
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cut-off parameter T , which represents a bound on the total number of “unstable queries” the algo-
rithm can answer before it halts in order to ensure (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Algorithm 5 ASubSamp [BTT18]: Private Classification via subsample-aggregate and sparse-vector
Input: Private dataset: S, upper bound on the number of queries: m, online sequence of classifi-
cation queries: Q = {x˜1, . . . , x˜m}, hypothesis class H, oracle access to a PAC learner of H:
BPAC, unstable query cutoff: T , privacy parameters: ǫ, δ > 0, failure probability: β.
1: c← 0, λ←
√
32T log(2/δ)
ǫ and k ← 34
√
2λ · log (4mT/min (δ, β/2))
2: w ← 2λ · log(2m/δ), wˆ ← w + Lap(λ) {Lap(b) denotes the Laplace distribution with scale
b}
3: Split S into k non-overlapping sub-samples S1, · · · , Sk.
4: for j ∈ [k] do
5: hSj ← BPAC(Sj)
6: for i ∈ [m] and c ≤ T do
7: Fi ← {hS1(xi), · · · , hSk(xi)} {For every y ∈ {0, 1}, let ct(y) = # times y appears in Fi.}
8: q̂xi ← arg max
y∈{0,1}
[ct(y)], distŷxi ← largest ct(y) - second largest ct(y)
9: yprivi ← Astab(S, q̂xi , distŷxi , wˆ, 12λ) {Stability test for q̂xi , given by Algorithm 6 below.}
10: if yprivi = ⊥, then c← c+ 1, wˆ ← w + Lap(λ)
11: Output yprivi
Algorithm 6 Astab [ST13]: Private estimator for f via distance to instability
Input: Dataset: S, function: f : Un → R, distance to instability: distf : Un → R, threshold: Γ,
privacy parameter: ǫ > 0
1: d̂ist ← distf (S) + Lap (1/ǫ)
2: if d̂ist > Γ, then output f(S), else output⊥
B.2 Description of Algorithm ASSPP
In Section 4, we use a semi-supervised semi-private learner construction from [ABM19] (referred
to as ASSPP) to give a construction for a universal PCQR algorithm that can answer any number of
classification queries (Algorithm 4). Fro completeness, we describe the construction of this semi-
private learner ASSPP in Algorithm 7 below2. Algorithm 7 takes as input two datasets: a private
dataset S of size n, and an unlabeled public dataset Tpub of size mo, and outputs a hypothesis
hpriv : X → {0, 1}. The main idea of the construction in [ABM19] is that the public unlabeled
dataset can be used to create a finite α-cover forH (see Definition B.1 below), and hence, reducing
the task of privately learningH to the task of learning a finite sub-class ofH (the α-cover).
Definition B.1 (α-cover for a hypothesis class). A family of hypotheses H˜ is said to form an alpha-
cover for a hypothesis class H ⊆ {0, 1}X with respect to distribution DX if for every h ∈ H there
exists a h˜ ∈ H˜ such that E
x∼DX
[
1(h(x) 6= h˜(x)
]
≤ α.
2A similar construction of the semi-private learner ASSPP has also appeared in the earlier work by Beimel et al. in
[BNS13].
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Algorithm 7 ASSPP [ABM19]: Semi-Supervised Semi-Private Agnostic Learner
Input: Private labeled dataset: S ∈ Un, a public unlabeled dataset: Tpub = (x˜1, · · · , x˜mo) ∈ Xmo ,
a hypothesis classH ⊂ {0, 1}X , and a privacy parameter ǫ > 0.
1: Let T˜ = {xˆ1, . . . , xˆmˆ} be the set of points x ∈ X appearing at least once in Tpub.
2: Let ΠH(T˜ ) = {(h(xˆ1), . . . , h(xˆmˆ)) : h ∈ H} .
3: Initialize H˜Tpub = ∅.
4: for each c = (c1, . . . , cmˆ) ∈ ΠH(T˜ ): do
5: Add to H˜Tpub arbitrary h ∈ H that satisfies h(xˆj) = cj for every j = 1, . . . , mˆ.
6: Use the exponential mechanism with inputs S, H˜Tpub , ǫ, and score function q(S, h) ,
−êrr(h;S) to select hpriv ∈ H˜Tpub .
7: return hpriv.
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